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LAY PARTICIPATION IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE:
ENHANCING JUSTICE SYSTEM LEGITIMACY IN
POST-CONFLICT STATES
EMILIE

T AMANt

ABSTRACT

In the aftermath of de-stabilizing coriflicts, the transition to sustainable
democracy is a challenging one. Open and transparent decision-making
processes which encourage lay participation are important to this
transition. With few remaining fimctional institutions, Governments
must undergo reform at eve1y level in order to effectively promote and
enforce the Rule of Law. Criminal justice reform, in particular, is
essential. This paper will examine lay participation in criminaljustice
and the role it can play in building legitimate criminal justice instUutions. The Canadian common law jwy will be examined as one model
and the French, civilian-style 'lay assessor' model as another. These
two models will then form the basis of an analysis of post-Apartheid
South Africa and post-genocide Rwanda. It will be argued that while the
jury system is effective in common law countries with legal infrastructures which support it, it may not be the most appropriate form of lay
participation for deeply fractionalized societies. Indeed, in both the
South African and Rwandan example it will be shown that lay assessors
are best suited to the promotion of legitimate criminal justice institutions in these States.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

The transition from an oppressive regime to participatory democracy is
often seen as the triumphant end to years of struggle and instability.
However, effecting the change in political leadership is only one small
step on the path to sustainable democracy. The long-term success of any
new democracy will only be feasible where there are strong institutions
which are capable of maintaining social order. This must occur not only
through the provision of education and health-related services, but
through the promotion and enforcement of the Rule of Law. Criminal
justice reform, in particular, is essential. Indeed, as Chris Mburu stated
at the World Bank Conference on Empowerment, Security and Opp01tunity Through Law and Justice:
Successful legal and judicial reforms depend largely on the existence
of an institutional infrastructure that permits the coordination of
projects by the different government entities involved in the administration of justice. In post-conflict situations, this infrastructure is
largely lacking because the conflict usually leads to the demise of most
institutions that symbolize the existence of a functioning state. To
commence on a program of judicial or legal reform in such situations,
it becomes necessary to try and reconstruct these institutions. 1

Those responsible for instituting refonn proposals are left with a daunting task. However, the complete rebuilding of legal institutions provides
reformists with an opportunity to implement infrastructures which will
be the most conducive to long-term legitimacy. A key element to the
promotion of this institutional legitimacy is lay participation in criminal
justice adjudication.
This paper is primarily concerned with two models of lay participation and what, if anything, they have to offer to the promotion of
legitimate criminal justice institutions in post-conflict societies: the jury
system and the use of lay assessors. There are variations on each of these
systems. For the sake of clarity, the Anglo-American model will be

1
Chris Mburu, "Challenges Facing Legal and Judicial Reform in Post-Conflict Environments:
Case Study from Rwanda and Sierra Leone" (2001) (Paper presented to the World Bank
Conference on Empowerment, Security and Opportunity Through Law and Justice, July 2001)
at 13 [unpublished, on-line: The World Bank Group <www.worldbank.org/legal/ljr_Ol/doc/
mburu.pdt>] [Mburu, "Challenges"].

LAY PARTICIPATION ... 35

examined as a template for the jury and the French system will be
examined as one of many ways in which lay assessors can be used. At
this point, it is important to note that the terminology used in the
literature on this subject is inconsistent. Often, jurisdictions which
employ a mixed bench of lay assessors and professional judges use the
language of "jury" to connote the lay participants. In order to make the
distinction clear, where the system does not involve an English-style
jury, the term assessor will be used in this paper.
It will be argued that while the jury system works in common law
countries with legal infrastructures that support it, it may not be the most
appropriate form of lay participation for deeply fractionalized societies.
However, it will be shown through an examination of South Africa in its
transition to full pmiicipatory democracy, that the use of lay assessors
should be promoted as a means of bringing legitimacy to criminal
justice systems in post-conflict states. Further, Rwanda will be considered to demonstrate the extent to which lay participation has been
encouraged in that country through the traditional gacaca comis which
are used in the place of conventional trials to deal with people accused
of genocide-related crimes.

II.

THE ANGLO-AMERICAN TRADITION: THE JURY IN CANADA

The jwy injects a democratic element into the law. This element is
vital to the effective administration of criminal justice, not only in
safeguarding the rights of the accused, but in encouraging popular
acceptance of the laws and the necessmy general acquiescence in
their application ... Martyrdom does not come easily to a man who has
been found guilty as charged by twelve of his neighbours and fellow
citizens.
Black J., dissenting in Green v. United States 2
The symbolic fzmction of the jury far outweighs its practical significance ... Adulation of the jury is based on no justification or spurious
justification ... The jury is an anti-democratic, irrational and haphaz-

2

356 U.S. 165 (1958) at 215-16 [Green] [emphasis added].
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ard legislator whose erratic and secret decisions run counter to the
rule of law.

- Penny Darbyshire3

These statements are evocative of the important role that the jury has
played in the Anglo-American tradition. Even Darbyshire's comment
which is clearly anti-jury, recognizes the symbolic significance of the
institution. This symbolism must not be underestimated as it promotes a
sense of connectedness of the general public to the criminal justice
process, infusing it with an important democratic element. However, it
will be seen that this "injection of a democratic element into the law" 4 is
not exclusive to the institution of the jury per se but rather may be
achieved through alternative forms of lay participation.

1. A Brief History of the Jury at Common Law

Lay participation in criminal justice has been an entrenched feature of
common law criminal justice processes for centuries. Indeed, it is believed to have been introduced in England with the Norman Conquest of
1066. 5 The role and composition of the jury underwent many incarnations in its early years but by 1215, the jury of twelve, as we know it
today, was the standard body of lay adjudicators, charged with the task
of making findings of guilt. 6 Initially, the jury played a different role in
the criminal justice process than it does today. In order to bring a much
needed local perspective, men from the community were asked to
participate in criminal adjudication. The purpose of this participation
was to include in the process people with particular knowledge of local
morals and custom who were likely to have first hand knowledge of the
events in question. In this respect, jurors performed a dual function: they
were responsible for both providing testimonial accounts as witnesses

3
Penny Darbyshire, "The Lamp That Shows That Freedom Lives - ls it Worth the Candle?"
(1991) Crim. L. Rev. 741 at 750 [emphasis added].
4
Green, supra note 2.
5
Ellison Kahn, "Restore the Jury? Or 'Reform? Reform? Aren't Things Bad Enough Already?' I" (1991) 108 S.A.L.J. 672 at 676 [Kahn, "Restore or Reform"].
6
Ibid.
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and for assisting with the making of ultimate factual conclusions. 7 This
was particularly true in the days before the emergence of the common
law doctrine of stare decisis. 8 Rather than look to a comprehensive body
of law for legal application of factual findings, the early jury participated with a view to ensuring that local justice was achieved: "its
structures looked to the society itself for the means and justification of
dispute resolution." 9
By the 17th century, the jury was beginning to take its modern form.
The transition was made from judicial reliance on jurors for their
particular, local knowledge of the matter at issue to reliance by judges
"on !jurors'] impartial, collective and unanimous response to evidence
the existence of which they had been unaware." 1° Furthermore, juries
were not educated in the law and relied on judges to articulate it to them,
particularly as a body of substantive law grew through the doctrine of
stare decisis and, ultimately, codification. These additions were not the
result of widespread political change but rather part of a gradual institutional reform that helped keep the jury relevant as the underlying
institutional structure was gradually transformed over time.
Today, the jury is a feature of many adversarial systems and enjoys
significant institutional legitimacy, largely as the result of its long
common law history. In fact, several countries now have constitutionally entrenched rights to trial by jury in criminal matters. In Canada, for
example, the right to trial by jury is articulated ins. 1 l(f) of the Charter
of Rights and Freedoms: 11
11 Proceedings in criminal and penal matters
with an offence has the right

Any person charged

(f) except in the case of an offence under military law tried before a
military tribunal, to the benefit of trial by jury where the maximum
punishment for the offence is imprisonment for five years or a more
severe punishment.

7

H. Patrick Glenn, "The Common Law in Canada" (1995) 74 Can. Bar Rev. 261 at 263.
Ibid. at 264.
9
Ibid. at 263.
1
°Kahn, "Restore or Reform", supra note 5.
11
Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982,
c.11 [Charter].
8
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Furthermore, Canadian laws of evidence, both at common law and as
codified in the Criminal Code, reflect the fact that lay jurors will often
be employed to make findings of fact. The common law rules of hearsay
and exclusionary rules relating to character evidence, for example, were
partly developed in response to the need not to confuse juries with
factual matters which were too disconnected to the material legal questions at issue. More generally, the underlying structures of the
adversarial system complement the use of lay juries in a way which the
civil inquisitorial system does not.
However, this is not to say that the jury system is without its
problems. In Canada, and the United States for example, while the jury
system forms part of a democratic framework which provides institutional safeguards for potential injustices that may result, it is nonetheless arguable that its long history overshadows potential problems with
the reliance on jurors in criminal prosecutions.

2. Current Problems with the Jury System in Canada
Despite the fact that the jury allows for lay participation in criminal
justice, it has been argued that juries are becoming increasingly unable
to deal with the problems of contemporary society. 12 Those who argue
against the introduction of juries in post-conflict states, for example,
argue that the jury system is appropriate only in homogeneous societies.13 Canada is an example of an ethnically diverse and linguistically
pluralized society in which the jury has been able to survive despite the
obvious lack of social homogeneity.
However, can it really be said that juries are effectively meeting the
needs of minorities in Canada? Considering the fact that jury trials are
far less common than they used to be and that the reality of population
growth and diversity highlight that juries tend not to be truly representative of one's peers, is trial by jury still relevant in this context?

12
See e.g. John H. Langbein, "On the Myth of Written Constitutions: The Disappearanee of
Criminal Jury Trial" ( 1992) 15 Harv. J .L. & Pub. Pol 'y 119 [Langbein, "The Myth"], and "The
Case for Blaek Juries", Note (1969-1970) 79 Yale L..T. 531 ["Black Juries"].
13
See e.g. Mashall S. Huebner, "Who Decides? Restructuring Criminal Justice for a Democratic South Africa" (1992-1993) 102 Yale L.J. 961 [Huebner, "Who Decides"].
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i. The Decline of the Jury

The first problem is not really a problem with the jury system per se but
rather with the fact that the use of juries is on the decline. As one
American author put it: "Although the [Constitution] mandates jury
trials for 'all' criminal cases, the reality is far different. In place of 'all,'
a more accurate term to describe the use of jury trial in the discharge of
our criminal caseload would be 'virtually none. "' 14 While the effects of
bypassing trials by jury are beyond the scope of this effort, it is certainly
an important trend to note. In particular, as criminal justice systems face
increasing pressures to deal with mounting case loads, many accused
people are induced to plead guilty in exchange for deals from the
prosecution. As this becomes an increasingly common way of dealing
with overburdened criminal justice systems, lay pmiicipation in criminal justice will be significantly reduced, leading to concerns that the
legitimacy of the system may be compromised over time.

ii. The Jury as a Cross-Section of Society

Another problem is that while an underlying premise of the use of juries
is to ensure that an accused is judged by his or her peers, individuals
accused of crimes will often find themselves before juries whose social
realities may be quite different from their own. In the United States, for
example, juries tend to be comprised of largely white, middle-class
citizens. 15 Black Americans, who are hugely over-represented in the
prison population, are under-represented on juries. 16 This imbalance has
the effect of not only undermining the legitimacy of a given proceeding
for an individual black accused, for example, but of undermining the
institution of the jury to the black community at large. 17 This challenge
to the institutional legitimacy of the jury may, over time, contribute to
lack of confidence in the wider criminal justice process for that community.

14
15
16
17

Langbein, "The Myth", supra note 12 at 120.
"Black Juries", supra note 12 at 532.
"Black Juries", supra note 12 at 534.
"Black Juries", supra note 12 at 534.
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However, the strength of legal institutions in the United States and
Canada has the effect of providing an institutional means through which
the effects of such problems may be mitigated against and thus public
confidence in the system remains largely unharmed. In particular, due to
the constitutional entrenchment of trial by jury and of legal equality in
Canada 18 there remains a right to challenge the validity of a jury verdict
where the jury selection process offends either of these constitutional
rights. Where a jury that is literally representative does not result, it is
thought that the institutionalized random selection process nonetheless
ensures trial faimess. 19
In Canada, this problem has been encountered largely in the context
of aboriginal peoples charged with criminal offences. In R v. Yooya, 20 for
example, the Saskatchewan Court of Queen's Bench looked at the scope
of the right to be tried by a jury of one's peers. In that case, the accused
sought to be tried before a jury selected from among individuals who
resided in Black Lake, the aboriginal community to which he belonged
and in which his criminal charges arose. The Court held that although
the trial was conducted in Prince Albert, there had been no infringement
of Mr. Yooya's constitutional rights and a fair trial was still possible.
This was due to the fact that the procedure through which the jury panel
was selected was done according to the Saskatchewan Juries Act2 1 and
nothing in that Act operated in such a manner as to offend the Charter.
The Court cited Justice L'Heureux-Dube in R. v. Sherrat as saying:
the perceived importance of the jury and the Charter right to jury trial
is meaningless without some guarantee that it will perform its duties
impartially and represent, as far as is possible and appropriate in the
circumstances, the larger community. Indeed, without the two characteristics of impartiality and representativeness, a jury would be unable
to perform many of the functions that make its assistance desirable in
the first place. 22

On the other hand, the Court in essence qualified this statement with a
quote from Regina v. Nepoose, in which Justice McFayden of the
Alberta Court of Queen's Bench stated:
Charter, supra note 11 at ss. 11 (f) and 15.
See e.g. Juries Act, R.S.N.S. 1988 c. 16 and other provincial Juries Acts which legislate the
means through which the random selection of jurors from the community should take place.
20
(1994), 126 Sask. R. l; [1995] 2 W.W.R. 35 (Sask. Q.B.) [Yooya].
21
R.S.S. (1981) c. J-4.
22
[1991] 1 S.C.R. 509 at 525, cited in Yooya, supra note 20.
18

19
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Canadian courts have consistently held that juries need not be selected
from any specific community, any specific race, nationality or other
identifiable minority, and that the right to trial by jury includes the
right to be tried by a jury selected at random from persons representing
a cross-section of the community. While participation from minority
groups must continue to be encouraged and facilitated, no accused is
entitle [sic] to trial by a jury selected on the basis of racial considerations which would result in the elimination of the general population
from the jury panel. 23

It is clear then that in Canada at least, the goal is to have a jury which is

randomly selected from the public at large. As long as there is equal
opportunity to sit on the jury, the goal of representative juries will be
deemed to have been achieved. Given the fact that the administration of
justice is left to the provinces, 24 there is, at a minimum, a guarantee that
the jury will be drawn from within the region. Beyond that, it would
seem that the courts are largely satisfied that although juries may not
always reflect a true cross-section of the accused's socio-economic
group, provincial jury selection legislation guarantees a jury system in
which a fair and legitimate verdict should be attainable. Indeed, a jury
comprised solely of an accused's peers could have an equally delegitimizing effect. As Mr. Justice Strach put it in R. v. A.F. 25
A jury's power rests in the capacity of individuals with diverse viewpoints to reach a common decision that can be accepted as the
community's verdict and will carry weight with a diverse community.
A jury representing the broad spectrum of society is a jury whose
independence and impartiality need not be suspect, and whose legitimacy is thus protected .... If a jury is weighted to reflect the values of a
particular group - be it only of the accused or of both the accused and
the victim - its impartiality and, hence, legitimacy will be questioned.
A jwy drawn on parochial lines cannot meet the necessary test of
expressing the conscience of the community.

It would seem that despite the existence in Canada of case law

challenging the jury selection process, 26 on the whole it is perceived as
(1991), 85 Alta. L.R. (2d) 18 (Q.B.) cited in Yooya, supra note 20.
Constitution Act, 1867 (U .K. ), 30 & 31 Viet., c. 3, reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App. II, No. 5 at
s. 92.
25 (1994), 22 C.R.R. (2d) 82; 30 C.R. (4th) 333 (Ont. Gen. Div.) [emphasis added].
26
See also Carter et al v. Jury Commission of Greene County et al (1969), 396 U.S. 320, 90 S.
Ct. 518 where a group of black citizens launched a class action law suit against the Jury
Commission alleging that the exercise of discretion by jury commissioners led to systemic
exclusion of black jurors.

13

14
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rendering fair outcomes most of the time while allowing for popular
paiiicipation in the process. Given the fact that a jury verdict which is
patently unreasonable may be appealed and even ove1iumed if it is
inconsistent with the evidence, it is likely that jury trials are well suited
to countries such as the United States and Canada. The Canadian courts
have undertaken to achieve a balance between a jury system seen by the
public as legitimately addressing the need for social representation on
the one hand, and a system which is administratively efficient on the
other.

iii. Jury Nulltfication

A final concern with the jury system in common law jurisdictions is the
limited trend of jury nullification. It is arguable that jury nullification is
the ultimate indicator that the jury is a truly democratic institution in that
it allows members of the public to protest an unfair law by refusing to
enforce it. At the same time, it is also arguable that jmy nullification is
anti-democratic in that it represents a disregard for democratically enacted laws and deprives the public of its right that laws be knowable in
advance.
The Supreme Court of Canada has had to deal with jmy nullification
on a number of occasions. In R. v. Morgentaler, the comi characterized
the power of a jury to nullify as "the citizen's ultimate protection against
oppressive laws and the oppressive enforcement of the law." 27 At the
same time however, the Comi warned that "recognizing this reality [that
a jury may nullify] is a far cry from suggesting that counsel may
encourage a jury to ignore a law they do not suppo1i or tell a jury that it
has a right to do so."28 In R. v. Latimer, the defence argued that an
accused person has a right to a jury with the power to nullify. The
Supreme Court rejected this argument stating explicitly that the right to
a fair trial guaranteed by section 7 of the Charter does not encompass
such an entitlement. 29 On the contrary, the Court argued, trial judges

27

28
29

(1988] 1 S.C.R. 30 at 78-79 [Morgentaler].
Ibid., cited in R. v. Latimer, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 3 at 32.
Ibid. at 35.
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should attempt to instruct the jury in such a manner as to ensure that the
jury applies the law properly and that jury nullification does not occur. 30
A problem with jury nullification in the context of post-conflict
states with weakened legal institutions is that it could be used not as a
protest against laws which are unfair but as a way of circumventing the
applicability of the law to certain classes of people. This problem has
been encountered in parts of the United States for example where all
white juries have refused to convict white men accused of violent crimes
against black victims. 31 In Canada, Supreme Court adjudication would
suggest that the courts will not allow jury nullification to become a
widespread enough phenomenon to cause concerns that criminal justice
institutions are becoming anarchic. Indeed, this is an example of how a
state with strong legal institutions can support a jury system where the
lay participants ultimately reach their conclusions independently and
without direct participation by the judge in the deliberation process.

3. Conclusion
The jury system works in Canada, despite its problems. The effectiveness of jury trials can be explained in two main ways. First of all, the
adversarial process and underlying common law system complement
the use of juries in such a manner as to make it a desirable fonn of lay
participation. Secondly, the Canadian institutional framework is able to
support the jury despite its shortcomings. However, an examination of
the lay assessor system in France will demonstrate that it is likely the
system best suited to the needs of emerging democracies and postconflict states.

30

Ibid at 35. See also, R. v. Shipley (1784), 4 Doug. 73, 99 E.R. 774 (K.B.), at 824, cited with
approval by Dickson C.J. in Morgenta/er, supra note 28 at 78.
31
"Black Juries", supra note 12 at 540.
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HI. THE CIVILIAN SYSTEM:
LAY ASSESSORS IN FRANCE
1. A Brief History

The jury in France made its first appearance as a result of a vote by the
Revolutionary Assembly in September of 1791. 32 Before that time,
criminal justice adjudication occurred in secret with routine use of
torture and other oppressive means to ensure convictions. 33 In fact, all
over continental Europe, with the fall of autocratic monarchies and the
transition to constitutional monarchies there was a tendency to adopt the
common law style jury in criminal matters as a reflection of the political
change and a symbol of democratic values. 34 In France, therefore, the
adoption of the jury system was more a product of political achievement
than of judicial reform.
However, the English-style jury never really took hold in France
with frequent calls for its abolition starting as early as 1800. 35 Ultimately, most European countries including France, which had eroded
the powers of the jury over the years, abandoned the jury because it was
not well suited to the inquisitorial process. 36 In France, this occurred
under the Vichy Regime of 1948. 37 Unlike the English situation, where
the substantive law, including the law of evidence, evolved with the
institution of the jury in mind, in France it was found that the jury did not
complement the pre-existing legal system. Nonetheless, it is clear from
the usage oflay assessors in the modem French state that the democratic
ideal of lay pmiicipation in criminal justice was never abandoned.

32
N.C.H. Dunbar, "The French Criminal Jury" ( 1968-70) 3 U. Tasm. L. Rev. 68 at 68 [Dunbar,
"French Jury"].
33
Roderick Munday, "Jury Trial, Continental Style" (1993) 13:2 L.S. 204 at 206.
34
Kahn, "Restore or Reform", supra note 5.
35
Dunbar, "French Jury" , supra note 32 at 69.
36
Kahn, "Restore or Reform", supra note 5 at 678.
37
Kahn, "Restore or Reform", supra note 5 at 678.
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2. Lay Assessors in the Modern French State
Today, the use of lay assessors in criminal proceedings is governed in
France by the Code of Criminal Procedure (the Code). 38 Interestingly,
the French Constitution does not mandate trial by jury in criminal
matters. 39 However, the Code provides at least a statutory guarantee of
lay participation in criminal justice in the Courts d'Assize in which the
most serious criminal offences are tried.
Articles 254-267 lay out the procedure for the selection of lay
assessors. These procedures resemble those set out by provincial Juries
Acts in Canada. Article 255 stipulates that lay assessors must be citizens
of at least 23 years of age who are able to read and right in French and
who enjoy full political, civil, and family rights. 4° Furthermore, once an
initial gathering of names has been generated from the electoral list,
names are to be selected through a lottery to ensure that there is a
reasonable element of randomness. 41 In general, as with the Canadian
example, the statutory selection procedure provides safeguards promoting a panel of assessors which represents a cross-section of society.
Pursuant to Article 240, the Assize court is deemed to include both
the professional and the lay assessors. Specifically, there are to be three
judges (the President of the Court and two professional assessors) 42 and
nine lay assessors. 43 Therefore, unlike the jury system where jurors are
considered to be a separate entity from the judge, in France the Code
calls for a collegial bench of mixed lay persons and professionals. In
fact, both the professionals and the lay people retire together and deliberate as a group. 44 Furthermore, Article 359 requires only a majority of
eight votes to convict unlike the requirement of unanimity in jury
trials. 45 The demand for eight votes ensures that a majority of the lay

Code de procedure penale. in "The American Series of Foreign Penal Codes: France" trans.
by Edward A. Tomlinson (Littleton, Colorado: Rothman, I 999) [Tomlinson].
39
Richard J. Terrill, "France" in World Criminal Justice Systems (Cincinnati: Anderson,
1997).
40
Tomlinson, supra note 38 article 255.
41
Tomlinson, supra note 38 article 261.
42
Tomlinson, supra note 38 articles 243 and 248(1 ).
43 Tomlinson, supra note 38 article 296(1 ).
44
Tomlinson, supra note 38article 355.
45
Tomlinson, supra note 38article 359.

38
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assessors are in favour of conviction without requiring a full consensus
to be reached by the court.
All of this is not to suggest that assessor systems will not face similar
concerns as jury systems with the challenge of ensuring representativeness as was discussed in the Canadian case law in the previous section.
However, the response to this concern is twofold: first, the assessor
system is no more prone to this problem than the jury system and
second, the collegial nature of the mixed bench ensures that juror biases
are curtailed to some extent.

3. Conclusion
In France there is supervision both of the judiciary by lay participants
and of lay participants by professional judges in the criminal justice
process. In creating a mixed bench the French have ensured that judges
cannot convict an accused without the support of the majority of lay
participants, thereby infusing the process with an important participatory democratic element. Additionally, lay assessors cannot convict an
accused without having to explain themselves to some extent to the
judge. This can serve to guard against emotionally driven verdicts by
juries. In other words, the French system would seem to be conducive to
achieving a balance between democratic involvement in criminal justice
on the one hand, and judicial control over lay participants on the other.
It is for this reason that the use of lay assessors is likely better suited
to the needs of post-conflict, fractionalized societies than is the jury
system. Lay participation ensures that judges are kept in touch with the
social reality beyond their otherwise privileged existence. This is particularly important in post-conflict societies where the social divide
tends to be far greater than it does in more institutionalized democracies.
On the other hand, keeping the assessors at ann's length ensures that the
element of accountability for decision-making tactics remains integral
to the process.
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IV. CASE STUDY:
LAY PARTICIPATION IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN
POST-APARTHEID SOUTH AFRICA
1. The Context of the Transition to Participatory Democracy
Both during and after apartheid, South Africa was one of the most
deeply fractionalized societies imaginable. The division of society
along racial lines perpetuated this fractionalization into the post-apartheid era. Despite the existence of strong institutions in South Africa
during apartheid, the need for institutional reform in that country was as
great as in any post-conflict state. In fact, the strength of the bureaucratic infrastructure during apartheid resulted in widespread distrust of
institutions by most citizens. The courts, in particular, were viewed as
"willing and obedient servants of a repressive legislature rather than
impartial and objective arbiters and dispensers of justice, stepping in to
protect the individual citizen from legislative and executive excesses."46
Of particular note is the fact that the jury system was abolished in South
Africa in 196947 and there was therefore no lay participation possible,
with the exception of very limited use of assessors which will be
discussed below.
During the period leading up to the transition to full participatory
democracy, a great deal oflegal academic work went into drafting a new
constitution with a judiciable bill of rights. 48 The Constitution which
eventually emerged from these discussions has been championed as a
model for any emerging democracy. However, it would seem that far
less academic thought went into how to reform many of the institutions
which would ultimately be charged with the task of putting the theory
behind the new Constitution into practice.
A particular challenge was that the pre-apartheid judiciary was to
remain in place when the new regime took power. 49 Therefore, the
M.G. Cowling, "Judges and the Protection of Human Rights in South Africa: Articulating
the Inarticulate Premise" (1987) 3 S.A.J.H.R. 177 at 181.
47 Niel Vidmar, "Juries and Lay Assessors in the Commonwealth of Nations: A Contemporary
Survey'', online: Duke Law <www.law.duke.edu/fac/vidmar/juriesandlay.pdt> [Vidmar, "Juries"].
48
Huebner, "Who Decides", supra note 13 at 961.
49
Huebner, "Who Decides", supra note 13 at 962.
46
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enforcers of apartheid who were largely responsible for the distrust of
legal institutions in the first place, were to participate in a new legal
order which it was hoped would ultimately be seen as legitimate by the
public at large.
No doubt, the new Constitution was a step in the right direction.
Modeled in part after the Canadian Charter ofRights and Freedoms, the
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 has a section devoted
to the rights of accused persons:
35 (3) Every accused person has a right to a fair trial, which includes
the right
a.

to be informed of the charge with sufficient detail to answer it;

b.

to have adequate time and facilities to prepare a defence;

c.

to a public trial before an ordinary court;

d.

to have their trial begin and conclude without unreasonable delay;

e.

to be present when being tried;

f.

to choose, and be represented by a legal practitioner and to be
informed of this right promptly;

g.

to have a legal practitioner assigned to the accused person by the
state and at state expense, if substantial injustice would otherwise
result, and to be informed of this right promptly;

h.

to be presumed innocent, to remain silent, and not to testify during
the proceedings;

1.

to adduce and challenge evidence;

J.

not to be compelled to give self-incriminating evidence;

k.

to be tried in a language that the accused person understands or, if
that is not practicable, to have the proceedings interpreted in that
language;

I.

not to be convicted for an act or omission that was not an offence
under either national or international law at the time it was
committed or omitted;

m. not to be tried for an offence in respect of an act or omission for
which that person has previously been either convicted or
acquitted;
n.

to the benefit of the least severe of the prescribed punishments if
the prescribed punishment for the offence has been changed
between the time that the offence was committed and the time of
sentencing; and of appeal to, or review by, a higher court. 50

° Constitution of the Republic of South Afhca 1996,

5

No. I 08 of 1996.
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The rights guaranteed by this Constitutional document are in many ways
reminiscent of the rights encompassed by the Canadian Charter. However, the right to be tried by a tribunal with lay paiiicipants is conspicuously absent. This is likely due to a recognition by the Constitution's
framers that the jury system had been largely unsuccessful in South
African history. However, it is unfortunate that an alternative form of
lay participation was not contemplated at that time.

2. A Brief History of the Jury in South Africa
The jury was first introduced in South Africa in 1828. 51 However, as in
France, the system never gained widespread acceptance and by 19 I 0,
statutory reforms were beginning to limit the use of juries. 52 By I 917,
the accused could elect to be tried by a judge alone due to the fact that
the all-white juries were proving unable to render verdicts which were
fair to blacks accused of criminal offences. 53 In 1969, juries were being
used in less than 1% of cases and the jury system was ultimately
abolished by the Abolition ofJuries Act 34 of that year. 54
During the period leading up to the transition to participatory democracy, what little discourse there was about legal institutional reform
was largely opposed to the reintroduction of the jury system to South
Africa. 55 Michael Huebner identifies three major concerns militating
against the implementation of a jury system in South Africa:
(i) the lack of support for it in the South African legal community; (ii)
the dysfunctions often associated with juries in highly fractionalized
societies; and (iii) the staggering administrative costs that the system
would entail. 56

Indeed, as one prominent South African legal commentator, Nico
Steyler, put it:
The export of the jury system to English-speaking Africa has not met
with success. It has been argued that the jury system, which implies
J.A. Chubb, "The Jury System" (1956) 73 S.A.L.J. 194.
Ibid at 199.
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autonomous decision-making by the jurors, can function properly only
where the community in which it operates is socially homogeneous
with no major racial, cultural, or religious divisions. In African countries where such divisions exist, kinship and group loyalties often
overrule fair application of the criminal law. 57

However, as was previously discussed, the jury has been able to endure
in ethnically diverse societies such as Canada and the United States.
One potential explanation for this is that Canada and the United States
are largely harmonious societies and have not experienced the same
degree of fractionalization as South Africa.
Racism continues to be a real problem in North America; however,
the jury system and legal institutions more generally are able to accommodate these concerns to some extent. This may be due in part to the
fact that ideas such as judicial independence and impartiality are more
widely accepted by the public as bringing legitimacy to the system.
Nonetheless, Steyler concludes by saying:
in our divided society, participatory democracy in general, and lay
participation in criminal justice in particular, may serve sectarian
interests rather than that of the whole community ... The group loyalties of lay members of courts may stand in the way of rational fact
finding. 58

The skepticism about the suitability of a jury system in South Africa
was more than mere conjecture. In Ghana, for example, it was argued
that juries were not appropriate following the transition to democracy:
The gaining of independence has not led to any extension of trial by
jury in spite of the eager adoption of the other marks of a modern
democratic state. This may be interpreted ... as further evidence of the
unsuitability of jury trial in present African conditions. 59

Huebner' s first two concerns were, therefore, clearly widespread. His
third concern, that the cost of implementing a jury system would be
staggering, arose out of the reality of linguistic pluralism in South
Africa. The need for and cost of translation services would be astoundNico Steyler, "Democratising Criminal Justice" (Paper presented at conference: A new
Jurisprudence for a future South Africa, U Pretoria October 1989) at 23 [Steyler,
"Democratising"], cited in Heubner, "Who Decides", supra note 13 at 972.
58
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ing. However, he notes that the main concern with the administrative
costs is tied to his belief that the jury system is not appropriate for South
Africa. In other words, Huebner argues, if it was demonstrated that
introduction of the jury system was the ideal way to bring public
confidence to the justice system it might be justifiable. However, given
the near unanimous opposition to reintroducing the jury system into
South Africa, the cost cannot be justified. 60
Having demonstrated that the jury system would be unlikely to solve
the problems with lack of public confidence in the criminal justice
system, it is necessary to look at whether the use of lay assessors might
overcome the sh01icomings of the jury system while maintaining the
needed element of democratic participation.
There is currently only limited use of lay assessors in South Africa.
In fact, as of 2001, the use of lay assessors was only mandatory in cases
involving murder, rape, robbery, assault and indecent assault although it
remained optional for a wider range of criminal offences. 61 This is
indicative of the fact that South Africa has not undergone the extent of
institutional refonn of criminal justice that is arguably needed if the
system is to enjoy any real legitimacy in the long tenn. In fact, the use of
lay assessors is scarcely more widespread than it was before the political
transition.
The Criminal Procedure Act of 1977 granted judicial discretion to
judges of the Supreme Court, the highest level in the hierarchy of comis
of first instance, to summon one to two assessors to paiiicipate in the
proceedings. The use of lay assessors was only legally required in trials
in which the judge saw the imposition of the death penalty as a potential
sentence. 62 However, less than 10% of criminal cases are heard at the
Supreme Court level. The majority are heard by magistrates in the lower
courts where the use of assessors was only possible with the permission
of the Minister of Justice before apartheid, which resulted in its virtual
disuse. 63 Fmiherrnore, the system for the selection of lay assessors did
nothing to bring participation in criminal justice to "the people." On the
contrary, assessors were virtual professionals, who usually had prior
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legal training and who were usually friends of the justices who requested their assistance. 64
If the purpose of employing lay assessors in the criminal justice
system is to inject an element of democracy into the process in order to
legitimize it, the pre-apartheid scheme in South Africa was clearly
unable to achieve this goal. A 1984 study undertaken to determine the
actual operation of the assessor system came to the following conclusion: "It is clear from the interview that the judges were very rarely
outvoted by their assessors when it came to public pronouncement on
guilt or innocence, or on the existence or absence of extenuating circumstances."65 Therefore, as Steyler noted: "where assessors are limited to
an advisory role and unrepresentative of the community, they represent
an exercise in sham democracy." 66
Huebner makes a series of recommendations for reforming the
assessor system to better suit the needs of the post-transitional criminal
justice institutions. He sees the use of assessors primarily as a means of
training black lawyers for careers as judges. 67 In effect then, what
Huebner advocates is not really lay participation but rather broader
participation by a more diverse sector of the legal community. In other
words, he sees the use of assessors as a short term tool for the achievement of greater ethnic diversity in the judiciary. However, if this is the
sole reason for implementing an assessor scheme, the longer term goal
of achieving a legitimate criminal justice system through lay participation will remain elusive.
The limited use of lay assessors at present in South Africa is a step in
the right direction. However, in order to infuse the system with the
needed element of democratic participation, the use of lay assessors
must be greatly expanded. Indeed, it should be mandatory, or at least
available at the option of the accused, at all criminal trials. Furthermore,
the selection process must ensure an element of randomness in order to
promote better representativeness. Amendments to the South African
Magistrates' Act in 1998 took some of the initial steps towards reform.
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In particular, Clause I amended section 34 of the old Act to remove the
requirement that assessors have "skill and experience in the matter to
which the action relates," 68 which would seem to suggest a move away
from more professional assessors to true laity in public participation.
Clause 2 amended the old s. 93 by providing that assessors may be
summoned in any matter, expanding somewhat the scope of offences in
which assessors may be used. However, the perpetuation of a system in
which the use of assessors is at the option of Magistrates is insufficient
to effectively promote true lay participation in South Africa.

3. Conclusion
Unfortunately, it is too soon to tell what effect lay participation is having
on public confidence in criminal justice institutions. This is due in part
to the fact that its use is not sufficiently widespread. Criminal activity is
on the rise in South Africa which suggests that the system is currently
failing to meet the needs of the South African people. A decade after the
transition to participatory democracy, South African legal institutions
are in need of further reform. Incorporation of widespread lay participation in criminal proceedings would bring popular legitimacy to criminal
justice institutions which they have likely never fully enjoyed.

V. AN EXTREME FORM OF LAY PARTICIPATION:
GACACA TRIALS IN RWANDA
1. A Brief History of the Conflict and of Resulting Criminal
Justice Concerns
Rwanda offers a tragic example of a country faced with significant
challenges in the aftennath of a devastating conflict. It is estimated that
the 1994 genocide claimed the lives of up to I million Rwandans in
fewer than three months. Most of these victims belonged to the Tutsi
68
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minority ethnic group. 69 Another two million took refuge in
neighbouring countries. 70 In the aftermath of the genocide, a new government - comprised largely of Tutsis who had been in exile since
before the genocide - took power in Rwanda. They inherited a state in
which virtually no functioning institutions existed. Yet, in order to
rebuild the country, the government was forced to rely upon those
institutions which remained despite their weakened state.
The civilian-style criminal justice system in particular, was plagued
with the dual function of maintaining or inducing social order in a
fractionalized society and bringing the perpetrators of the genocide to
justice. This proved to be an impossible task under the existing infrastructure.71 Ultimately, the United Nations instituted the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), an ad hoc tribunal to assist in
bringing justice to the people of Rwanda and ending the cycle of
impunity. 72 However, domestic prosecution remained a national priority
in order to ensure that perpetrators who did not fall within the jurisdiction of ICTR were brought to justice.
A problem arose with the government's commitment to continuing
with local prosecutions in that legal institutions were virtually nonexistent after the genocide. In fact, the Government of Rwanda provided
the following statistics on the extent to which legal infrastructures had
been damaged: of 750 judges in early 1994, 244 remained after the
genocide; out of eighty-seven prosecutors, fourteen remained; out of
193 Inspector Police Judiciaries (investigators), thirty survived; out of
214 court clerks, only fifty-nine remained. 73 The Government of
Rwanda further estimates that, given the lack of prosecutors, judges, and
lawyers, it would take the conventional court system over 200 years to
deliver justice. 74
Ulvin, Peter, "The Introduction of a Modernized Gacaca for Judging Suspects of Participation in the Genocide and the Massacres of I 994 in Rwanda" (Paper presented to the Belgian
Secretary of State for Development Cooperation) at 2 [unpublished, online: The MinnesotaStanford-Wisconsin MacArthur Consortium on Peace and International Cooperation <http://
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In order to deal with the problem, the government, with the assistance of the international community, established a number of intensive
training programs aimed at establishing a core of trained legal personnel
who could undertake the daunting task of rebuilding the judicial system. 75 In the meantime, thousands of genocide suspects sat in prison,
with no prospects for a trial in the near future. In fact, by the end of 2000,
there were over 130,000 prisoners being held in facilities which could
not accommodate such numbers. 76 Furthermore, most of the efforts at
rebuilding were geared towards government-oriented infrastructure,
such as the prosecution service and the judiciary. At this stage, however,
little effort was put into providing genocide suspects with defence
counsel. 77
In light of the fundamental inability of the formal justice system to
deal with the detainees, it was determined that a creative solution was
necessaiy. If legal institutions were to have any hope of rebuilding in
any sustainable way, it would be necessary to relieve them of as much of
the burden of dealing with genocide suspects as possible. Structural
expediency had occurred to some extent in the early aftermath of the
genocide through the creation of temporary legal structures known as
commissions de triage which undertook to quickly process genocide
cases. 78 It was not long, however, before it became clear that the commissioners simply lacked the legal training to conduct trials in such a
manner as to ensure even minimal legitimacy and the project was
abandoned. Furthermore, the lack of any lay participation in the process
no doubt further undermined the legitimacy of the process since it was
completely detached from the people of Rwanda.

2. The Establishment of the Gacaca Courts
In response to concerns that the domestic prosecution of war criminals
was failing to address both the need for impunity of genocide perpetrators and national reconciliation, the Government decided to reintroduce
75
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a traditional community-based justice system known as the gacaca. 79
This fonn of traditional justice was typically reserved for conflict resolution within small communities, particularly with respect to property
disputes; however, it was felt that it could be transformed to suit the
needs of the grossly overburdened criminal justice system. According to
Peter Ulvin, a consultant for the Belgian government, the aim of the
gacaca is twofold: (i) speeding up the trials and emptying the prisons;
and (ii) involving the community, including the victims, in establishing
the truth and through that truth, promoting reconciliation. 80

i. The structure and fimction of the gacaca courts
The gacaca tribunals have been created throughout the country and will
allow for public participation, even at the most local level. Indeed, the
plan is that over 200,000 people will participate in more than 10,000
gacaca tribunals. 81 The government has created a hierarchy of genocide
offences as well as a hierarchy of courts:
CATEGORY

1

GENOCIDE OFFENCES

(i)

persons whose criminal acts or acts of participation place them among the planners,
organizers, instigators, supervisors and
leaders of the crime of genocide or any
other crime against humanity

(ii) persons who acted in positions of authority
at the National, Prefectorial, Communal,
Sector or Cell level, or in a political party,
army, religious organizations or militia and
who perpetrated or fostered such crimes
(iii) notorious murderers who through particular zeal distinguished themselves in certain areas.
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CATEGORY

GENOCIDE OFFENCES

GA CA CA

JURISDICTION

2

persons whose criminal acts place them among
the perpetrators, conspirators or accomplices
of intentional homicide or of serious assault
[sic] against the person - causing death

Commune
Level

3

persons whose acts make them guilt [sic] of
other serious assaults against the person of
another

Secteur Level

4

persons who committed crimes against
property

Cellule Level

hearing and passing judgment of appeals from
the lower gacaca courts

Prefecture

Appeals

Hierarchy of Offences and Jurisdiction of gacaca tribunals 82
Therefore, even at the level of small rural communities (Cellule Level),
there will be an opportunity for public participation in the trials. Every
level of court has a general assembly which is present before the
tribunal, participates in discussing the acts (providing testimony and
counter-testimony), and which contributes to the making of arguments
in favour or against findings of guilt. The members of the general
assembly at the Celfule Level are further responsible for compiling lists
of those who were victims of the genocide including victims of rape and
of those who participated in the crimes. They must also compile lists of
those who moved away from their usual residences during the genocide. 83 The general assembly offers strong inducements towards confession through significant reductions in penalties. 84 This is likely the result
of the belief that confession best ensures truth and thus reconciliation.
At the Cellule Level, the general assembly is made up of all inhabitants
of the Cellule who are over 18 years of age. At the higher levels in the
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court hierarchy, the members of the general assembly are comprised of
representatives from lower levels. 85
The judges of the gacaca court council itself must be "respectable
people of at least 21 years of age and elected by people of voting age"
from within the general assembly. All members of the gacaca at all
levels are lay people. There are no professionals involved in the process
with the exception of members of the Coordination Committee which is
due to be set up by the Ministry of Justice in con-oboration with the High
Court to monitor the progress of the gacaca courts and to ensure that the
proceedings are undertaken in a fair and equitable manner. 86
To a foreign observer, in particular a foreign observer from a state
with strong legal institutions, there are immediate concerns about the
legitimacy of the gacaca process. Indeed, the gacaca system subverts
several fundamental principles of democratic justice agreed upon
through international human rights instruments such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. There is a lack of separation between the
adjudicators and the prosecution, no defence counsel, strong pressures
to self-incriminate, no legally reasoned verdicts, and no nationally
agreed upon punishment - which could result in vast regional differences in sentencing. 87 As a result, many human rights observers have
been skeptical of the gacaca process. 88 However, such analysis must not
be undertaken in a vacuum. Indeed, as Peter Ulvin argues, some
compromise is inevitable due in part to the fact that international standards of criminal law "were not designed to deal with the challenges
faced when massive numbers of people victims and perpetrators of
crimes - have to live together again, side by side." 89
It is important, therefore, when assessing the gacaca system, to bear
in mind the alternative. While the formal justice system may appear on
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its face to be an institution that is more capable of respecting human
rights norms, the reality is quite different. In fact, the formal system has
proven unable to guarantee the right to a trial within a reasonable time
(at present, some of the accused have been incarcerated for almost a
decade without a trial). The conditions are abhorrent by international
standards as the prison population is almost double that which can be
reasonably accommodated. 9° Furthermore, less than forty percent of
those brought to justice through the formal system had access to defence
counsel and the quality of the prosecutors, investigators, and judges was
minimal at best. 91
While prosecution by ICTR does guarantee respect for the rights of
the accused, it is incapable of processing large numbers of people.
Furthermore, ICTR is greatly removed from the Rwandan people. Not
only is the tribunal itself located in Arusha, Tanzania, but with no lay
participation, it is likely that most Rwandans have little knowledge of
the prosecutions undertaken by the tribunal.
Ulvin argues that while the gacaca procedure may not appear conducive to the respect of international norms of criminal justice, it may be
so indirectly. For example, while there is no defence counsel or formal
prosecutor, the back and forth dialogue among members of the general
assembly may actually amount to the equivalent of a full and fair
defence. 92 Furthennore, the members of the general assembly have first
hand knowledge of the events and are perhaps more likely to come up
with a realistic picture of what actually happened than a dossier assembled by bureaucrats in Kigali. It is worth noting as well that the
prisoners and their families seem to support the gacaca, 93 which suggests that they see it as a superior system to the one that has been failing
them thus far. According to a 2001 United Nations Study, piiot gacaca
courts acquitted in approximately 1/3 of cases and emphasized incorporating community public works service in sentencing instead of further
prison time. 94 These numbers are promising in that they do not indicate a
propensity towards conviction in all cases.
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In many respects, the gacaca courts resemble pre-17th century
juries at common law. It is arguable, in fact, that the lack of infrastructure in Rwanda, both institutionally and in tenns of transportation and
communications, has resulted in a system with needs similar to those
faced by early common law courts. Early common law juries were felt to
be capable of delivering justice and there is no reason why the gacaca
courts should be any different.

3. Conclusion
The gacaca courts have been instituted as a means of achieving transitional justice. In other words, once the perpetrators of the 1994 genocide
have been dealt with, the role of the gacaca courts will have become
obsolete. However, it might be in the best interest of the people of
Rwanda for the government to consider a similar system in the longer
term. Widespread corruption in what remains of the formal justice
system, as well as a general lack of confidence in severely weakened
government institutions, has created fertile soil for widespread reform.
Indeed, whether the civil-style court structure is rebuilt or an entirely new criminal justice system is instituted, lay participation will be
the key to its success. Particularly in the aftermath of significant public
participation in the gacaca trials, as the new Rwandan democracy is
built and institutions are strengthened, the government should continue
to promote lay pariicipation at all levels in order to ensure the sustainable legitimacy of criminal justice in Rwanda.

VI. CONCLUSION
Institutional reform must be a priority of emerging democracies and
post-conflict states. In particular, legal institutions must be reformed
with a view to increasing lay pariicipation in criminal justice processes.
Effective promotion of the Rule of Law will only be attainable when
institutions are seen as legitimate by the people. This will be most
possible if democratic values at a macro-political level infuse every
level of government. In particular, the use of juries or lay assessors in
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criminal justice systems allows for democratic participation at one of
the most potentially hostile intersections between the individual and the
State - where the individual's liberty is at stake through the potential
application of criminal sanctions. It has been argued that in deeply
fractionalized societies, lay assessors are likely best suited for the
fulfillment of the need for lay participation.
South Africa has acknowledged this need only to a limited extent.
Academic literature seems to recognize the need for lay participation
and yet this has not been put into effective practice in criminal justice
adjudication in South Africa at present. South Africa remains a deeply
fractionalized society which could benefit from increased democratic
participation.
Rwanda, on the other hand, is best described as remaining in a state
of transition. The gacaca courts represent a creative means of dealing
with the overburdened criminal justice system. With any luck, the
lesson learned from the gacaca trials will be that including the public in
such impmiant proceedings helps bring legitimacy to legal institutions
and thus forwards the adoption of democratic values.
A sad reality of the state of world affairs is that the trend towards
democratization through conflict is far from over. The number of states
actively involved in attempts to rebuild and strengthen institutions in the
name of sustainable democracy is significant. The importance of democratic participation at all levels, therefore, must not only be promoted, it
is a value upon which the legal system must insist.

